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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Private entrepreneurs in China are in larger scale registering their companies as limited 
liability company rather than a private firm. In 2004 approximately 65% of private firms in 
China were registered as limited liability companies (Nee and Opper, 2012), raising 
consideration on why entrepreneurs are opting to register their company differently? This 
thesis aims to find out if companies’ registration status plays a significant role in order to 
obtain loan quotas from Chinese state owned commercial banks and further explore if there is 
a significant difference in total profits between differently registered companies.  
The emerging private sector in China has been one of the biggest sparks of China’s 
economic growth in the last decades. The development of the private sector has been 
remarkable and in 2005 it generated approximately 50% of the country’s Gross National 
Product. When looking at the development of the private sector in China it is notable how the 
Chinese government favors State Owned Enterprises (SOE´s) and focuses more on sectors 
where large SOE´s play critical role. The favoring of SOE´s through policy making, access to 
resources and access to capital is evident and has been a subject of much research (Allen et 
al., (2005), Zhou, (2009) and Brandt and Li,(2003)). The importance to have a well-
functioning and highly developed capital market along with financial intermediaries is 
considered vital in order to foster a successful corporate sector (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
When applying this statement to the case of China it is apparent that China does not possess 
all these vital factors. The Chinese financial market is still underdeveloped, rule of law is 
unpredictable, property protection is weak and there is always the risk of government 
interference. Still despite these possible hindrances the private sector in China has developed 
into a successful sector.     
What makes the development of the private sector especially interesting relates to the 
role of formal financial institutions in China. The role played by formal financial institutions 
in helping to finance the expansion of the private sector is still an unsolved question. It is 
assumed that access to capital is one of the foundations for companies in order to grow and 
develop, however in China most lending from State Owned commercial banks in China seem 
to be channeled to SOE´s in certain sectors.  
Firth et al. (2009), conducted a study in order to gain understanding on how banks and 
other formal financial institutions made their lending decisions in regards to non-listed 
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businesses, only to receive mixed results in regards to previous studies. They did not manage 
to find any pattern in regards to how financial institutions in China value companies credit 
possibilities. China has often been used as a counter example to the findings of existing 
literature on institutions, growth, finance and law (Allen et al., 2005) showing no resemblance 
to other international evidence that are used as a background on conditions needed in order to 
be successful. Building on Firth et al. (2009) study, the focus of this study is to find if 
ownership registration status of companies influences their possibilities in obtaining loan 
quota from formal financial institutions in China and if there is a connection between 
companies obtained loan quotas and their total profits. 
The findings show that ownership registration status is important for companies once 
obtaining loan quotas from formal financial institutions. Privately registered companies are 
receiving considerable less loan quotas then state owned companies and limited liability 
companies. The results also give mixed results in regards to economic development theory, 
indicating that size and age of firms play a significant role which is in line with the theory and 
previous studies regarding credit access, while fixed assets have no relevance which is 
contradicting. The results also show that private companies are returning higher profits then 
the two previously mentioned registration forms, which is very interesting since it should be 
expected that companies that have better access to credit should be returning higher total 
profits. This indicates that privately registered companies seek alternative lending from 
informal sources in order to finance their development.  
 
1.2 Research objective 
Credit plays an important role for companies’ development possibilities, without credit 
companies run the risk of never being able to fulfill their production potential and since the 
Chinese economy does not appear to follow the classical economic development theory, 
access to credit is an interesting subject. The motive for this study comes from when I was 
traveling through Songyang County in Zhejiang province in China. There I had discussions 
with entrepreneurs about their companies and the future development of it. The discussion 
suggested that restrictions to formal credit were too great and that if they sorely needed credit 
they would rather turn to their family, friends or other informal sources rather than formal 
institutions. Expanding on these considerations I found suggestions that many private 
companies are registering their company as a limited liability company rather than a private 
company in order to improve their possibilities in obtaining loans as well as to increase their 
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profit possibilities. The motives for this thesis come from the interest of exploring if 
registration status of companies is having an effect on their possibilities to obtain loans from 
formal financial institutions and if there is a great difference in profits between these different 
registration forms. The objective of this thesis is twofold: 
  
 To describe and measure the effect of companies registration status in regards to 
obtained loan quota from formal financial institutions in China. 
 
 To elaborate on loan quota to find out if there is statistical difference for different 
company registration forms in regards to total profits, that is if companies that are 
receiving higher loan quotas are experiencing higher total profits than others. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
The thesis aims to explore the relationship between companies registration status and loan 
quota obtained from formal financial institutions.  It then moves into exploring if there is a 
difference between ownership registration statuses in regards to profits in order to see if loans 
from formal financial institutions are a decisive feature for Chinese company structure.  In 
order to fulfill the objectives of this thesis the focus is on two specific research questions: 
 
1. Does companies’ registration status play a significant role in order to obtain loan 
quotas from Chinese formal financial institutions? 
 
2. Are the companies that receive higher loan quotas from formal sources returning 
higher total profits then other companies with different registration status?  
Answers to these questions can have insightful information for policy making if the 
Chinese government wants to improve access to formal credit for all private companies. In 
order to help answering these research questions two hypotheses will be put forward.  Using 
data from Investment Climate Survey (ICS) in China for the year 2004 two econometric 
models will be presented and analyzed in order to answer the hypothesis. The results from the 
models are then related to the two research questions put forward.  
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1.4 Disposition 
The first introducing chapter gives the fundamentals for understanding the broad context of 
the thesis with short background information, objectives and research questions. Chapter 2 
reviews some previous research of the subject, while chapter 3 shapes the theoretical 
framework and introduces the hypothesis used in this study. Chapter 4 gives a deeper 
background of China´s private sector and financial market. Chapter 5 shortly explains the 
methods used to analyzing the data. Chapter 6 describes the data in use. Chapter 7 presents 
the empirical analysis and chapter 8 concludes. Bibliography and appendix are then presented 
at the end. 
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2. Previous Research  
Bank credit is commonly considered an important aspect of economic development. As early 
as the beginning of the nineteenth century scholars such as Schumpeter (1911; 1931) and 
Wicksell (1898) explained the growing importance of credit in economic development. The 
theory of economic development presented by Schumpeter was the idea that bank credit was a 
prerequisite for entrepreneurs to finance their innovative investment activity.  
Much has been discussed regarding the differences of internal and external credit 
markets and how they benefit companies. Williamson (1975) explained the benefits of having 
a diverse credit markets, he argued that internal capital markets can help firms to allocate 
credit more efficiently than external capital markets resulting in companies reducing wasteful 
investment at lower cost. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Stein (1997) agree to Williamson’s 
explanation and further explain how information asymmetries in internal capital market are 
more transparent which helps allocate credit in a more efficient manner. The problem with 
internal capital markets on the other hand are stressed by Berger and Ofek (1995), 
Schlingermann et al. (1999) and Shin and Stulz (1998), that internal capital market can result 
in more under and over investing in comparison to the external capital market.  
More recent studies discuss the importance to have credit available to all who are in 
need of it. Di Patti and Dell´Ariccia (2004) show how competition in the banking industry 
affects credit supply and can be beneficial for borrowers. A more competitive banking sector 
results in an increase in companies establishments, while too much market power in hands of 
the banking sector result in a decrease in companies establishment. 
When applying these previous studies to the case of China, it raises some fundamental 
thoughts. The Chinese financial sector and credit market does not seem to follow the classical 
structure that theory expects financial markets to possess, making the case of China all the 
more interesting. 
The case of China is often discussed in regards to the previous East Asian miracle 
countries, especially Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The World Bank published in 1993, a 
report called The East Asian miracle where they promote how these miraculous countries 
(with special focus on Japan) managed to get the basics right
1
 in their economy resulting in 
exceptional growth of their economy. The report discussed how the countries’ benefitted from 
government led push for export of manufactured goods as well as how selective credit 
                                                 
1
 The basics meant macroeconomic stability, low inflation, stable and competitive exchange rates, having 
relative prices of traded goods close to international prices and investment in education and social infrastructure.  
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programs (lending to certain large companies in special sectors) helped promote the export led 
growth that was driving the country’s economic development. The success of Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan are undisputed, the East Asian model on the other hand is not, scholars are 
critical in regards to the results of the report. Robert Wade (1990), criticizes the results that 
promoted sectors grew more and quicker than others because of government interference, 
showing how other sectors were growing just as quickly as the promoted once. Joseph Stiglitz 
(1996), discussed the importance of human capital investment along with high savings rate in 
the countries which allowed the governments to invest in infrastructure.  
China shares many characteristics of the East Asian development model including 
high dependence on export markets, state control over the financial sector and the government 
direct promotion of SOE’s (Baek, 2005). However China differs from countries such as Japan 
and South Korea and other South East Asian countries in some important perspectives. The 
SOE’s in China still possess a large share of the economy and the “opening up policy” was 
restricted to certain areas within the country (mostly eastern coastal areas) and the financial 
market is still underdeveloped which keeps transnational capital from moving freely. Along 
with this domestic savings have developed reserves to supply funds to large SOE’s (Walder, 
1996; So and Chiu, 1995). Dic Lo (2006), argues that from the 1990’s China has benefitted 
from growth paths that are characterized by capital deepening.  
An important feature of the Chinese economic development is its trial and error 
approach of the government, although that explanation is commonly agreed by scholars, Nee 
and Opper (2012), explain that the success and failure of China’s market transition tends to 
emphasis on political actors in central or local governments. Important actors in the market 
such as the private sector have long been discriminated against and play a significant part in 
Chinese economy today. The way that the private sector has managed to develop despite 
many hindrances is an interesting subject. 
A deeper theoretical background will be discussed in the following chapter.  
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3. Theory and Hypothesis  
When measuring the effects of credit on economic development the measurements of changes 
in Gross Domestic Production (GDP) are commonly used. However it is important to use 
clear theoretical approach in order to understand the foundations behind the study. This is 
done here by relating measures of loan quota and total profits to various independent 
characteristics in a regression framework. By doing that researchers are able to distinguish the 
difference behind independent variables chosen for the analysis, which in turn can be used to 
recognize the main determinant affecting loan quota and total profits for companies and draw 
conclusions based on them. Before analyzing these measures it is important to have a look at 
numerous theoretical considerations. That includes to theoretically justifying the dependent 
and independent variables in the econometric models as well as the estimations methods and 
interpretation of the results. 
3.1 Theoretical considerations 
An understandable issue concerns the selection of dependent variables, the decision to use 
companies’ registration status rather the company’s ownership structure will be further 
discussed in chapter 6. When choosing which independent variables to include in the two 
regression analysis it is important to consider the once that are potentially determents of the 
previously chosen dependent variables. The availability of certain variables in the dataset 
cannot be considered a sufficient justification for using them. Variables should in general be 
chosen by outlining a theoretical model for how loan quota and total profits are determent. 
The structure of the models used is based on the role of credit in economic development 
theory. 
 
3.2 The role of credit in economic development theory  
Economic development theory is commonly used by scholars to explain the complex 
interdependent problems of  economic development. The theory takes on many different 
aspects and combines analysis of economic, sociological, political, historical and ideological 
matters (Kurihara, 1957). Joseph Schumpeter´s introduced his Theory of Economic 
development in 1911, where he emphasizes on the role of private entrepreneurs, innovation 
and credit. Schumpeter’s approach explains the importance of technology and innovation in 
economic process and puts immense emphasis on the role of credit in economic development. 
Schumpeter explained how bank credit played significant role in detaching the needed 
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productive resource from their established location in the circular flow to the new 
combinations (Hansen, 1936). It has been shown empirically by many scholars (for example 
King and Levine, 1993, Love, 2003 and Rajan and Zingales, 1998) that the financial system 
can promote economic growth. Having access to credit allows companies to borrow against 
future income and invest in order to further develop. A well operating financial system is vital 
in channeling funds to the most productive uses and to allocate risk to those who can best bear 
them, resulting in increased economic growth, improved opportunities, better income 
distribution and reduced poverty (Kunt et al., 2008).  
Economic development theory has throughout the years developed itself into a more 
holistic look with many different elements making up a healthy society. Hoff and Stiglitz 
(2001) explained how economic development is no longer seen as primarily the process of 
credit accumulation but rather a process of organizational change, and Auster et al. (1969) and 
Mantzavins et al. (2006) explained how increased education and healthcare should result in 
higher outputs.  
The process of investment and its effect on economic development needs to be 
considered carefully. Although the theory states that increased investment should lead to 
increased economic growth, Schumpeter (1935) stressed that the theory does not fully grasp 
the importance and consequences of the investment until more is known about the relative 
importance of its sources and the actual behavior of lenders and borrowers. He then goes on 
explaining the importance of knowing what is actually done with the credit obtained. Having 
access to credit is of limited use if not used in a productive way, if credit for example is only 
used to cover losses there will be limited development of companies.  
 
3.3 China and economic development theory  
China is often used as a counter example of economic development theory, despite having 
weak (underdeveloped) financial system it has been one of the fastest growing economies in 
the world. The private sector in China has played an important role in China’s economic 
transformation, its gradual development has been remarkable despite government’s 
discrimination on their behalf. Since the early 1990 and up to 2000 the private sector has 
grown into providing almost one third of China’s industrial outputs (Zhang and Ming, 2001). 
Despite the rapid growth of the private sector in China, borrowing from state owned 
commercialized banking sector by private firms is deficient. Gregory et al. (2000) showed 
how companies in the private sector in the early 1990 received less than one percent of the 
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total lending of China’s commercial banks. Lardy (1999) and Zhang and Ming (2001), 
suggested that most investments and working capital were financed through informal 
networks, inter firm credit and retained earnings. Along with this Allen et al. (2005), argue 
that the reason behind the development of the private market in China comes from their 
reliance on alternative financing channels in informal markets rather than the formal external 
financial market. 
Since the 1990 the Chinese government has been trying to develop their financial 
environment, the introduction of the company law in 1994 was in theory a positive step in 
recognizing the private sector. The intent of the law however was not to provide legal 
framework for the developing private sector rather it aimed at restructuring the poorly 
performing SOE´s (Nee and Opper, 2012). As a result the registration form of companies 
needs to be considered. Because of the inferior image of private firms in China, entrepreneurs 
began to register their companies as limited liability companies or joint stock ventures in 
order to look more desirable, proper and appropriate for the customers (Suchman, 1995). By 
doing so entrepreneurs believed that they would have better access to resources such as credit 
as well as receive more business than if they were registered as private ownership company. 
By 2004, 65% of private companies in China were formally registered as limited liability 
companies (Nee and Opper, 2012). These registration findings raise a fundamental question. 
Does companies’ registration status play a significant role in order to obtain loan quotas from 
Chinese state owned commercial banks? And do the companies that receive higher loan 
quotas return higher profits then the others? The aim of this paper is to add to existing 
literature regarding companies’ access to formal credit and the effects that credit has on 
companies’ performance. Using data of 12.400 companies in China collected by the World 
Bank and its associated, the aim is to find out if companies’ registration status plays a 
significant role in order to obtain formal loan quotas and if these loan quotas result in higher 
performance of these companies. The following hypotheses are put forward in order to help 
answering the research questions previously presented. 
3.3.1 Hypothesis 1  
Companies with private ownership registration receive lower loan quotas than companies 
registered as limited liability company, collective company or state owned company. 
3.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
Companies that receive higher loan quotas are returning higher total profits than the 
companies receiving less loan quotas from formal financial institutions. 
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4. The private and financial market in China 
This chapter is aimed to further explain the development of the private market and the 
structure of the financial market in China. In order to better understand the results from the 
regression presented in chapter 7 it is important to familiarize with the emerging private 
sector in Chinese economy since the opening up policy in 1978 and the development and 
current conditions of the financial market. 
  
4.1 Emerging private sector in China 
The development of the domestic private market in China has since the opening up policy in 
1978 been a remarkable story. Despite being discriminated against by the government the 
private sector has become vital for Chinese economy. Their significance in the national 
economy became very large before the government adapted privatization policies for SOE´s 
and township village enterprises in 1995 (Qian, 2000 and Zhou, 2009). The growth of private 
firms played significant role in keeping unemployment rate low during the restructuring of 
SOE´s around 1993. During this period employment for SOE´s started to decline because 
public firms in the cities started to streamline labor force and this happened before the 
national labor retrenchment program was introduces in 1997.  
From 1978-2001 private businesses grew from almost zero to 38 million. The 
influence of the private sector rose significantly and the sectors contribution in terms of the 
country’s national industrial output grew rapidly (see graph 1) and today counts for 
approximately one third of total industrial outputs. In 2004 more than 50% of the country’s 
GDP was coming from the private sector rising to almost 70% in the year 2009, interestingly 
the growth rate of the sector has in recent years been higher than the national GDP rate 
(Zheng and Yang, 2009). 
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Graph 1. Gross industrial outputs as percentage of total industrial output value.  
 
(Source: Various Chinese Yearbooks) 
 
During the first years of the reform, private companies were restricted by the political 
elite to only play a marginal stop gap in the economy and although the government supported 
and even encouraged household business it was restricted to employ a maximum of 8 
employers and could only enter certain industries which produced consumer’s goods and 
service (Nee and Opper, 2012). Along with this private companies were considered inferior to 
other forms of ownership, people preferred SOE’s lifetime employment and viewed private 
companies as the last resort for people who were not able to get jobs at SOE’s. What the 
government did not anticipate was that the large number of startup firms would quickly 
develop into sizable manufacturing enterprises. Already during these early stages company 
registration status was being exploited, local politicians allowed large private companies to 
register themselves legally as a collective enterprise that was owned by the government. 
Despite this registration all firm operation where not intervened by the government and the 
founding capital was private. These companies have been described as a “red hat” firms and 
by registering as a collective enterprise, companies created a more preferential working 
environment. They became more ideology acceptable and had better access to material and 
received more favorable taxes. In return of being registered as a collective enterprise the 
company paid management fee which usually was a percentage of after tax profits (Nee and 
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Opper, 2012). By paying tax to the government that was connected to the profit of the 
company incentives were created for the government, the need to create a good business 
environment became important in order for companies to perform to their full potential and 
returning higher amounts to the local governments.   
Another registration status which entrepreneurs used in order to be acknowledged as a 
state enterprise was to attach their company to established collective or state units. These 
entrepreneurs paid a fee to use the name, bank account and stationary of the registered 
company. These types of companies however often experienced troubles with the 
government, they needed to pay special taxes (which often were extremely high) and needed 
to donate to community projects. Along with these fees, poor property rights in the country 
made it difficult for these kinds of companies to thrive (Nee and Opper, 2012). 
It was not until 1988 that private companies were recognized by the government, the 
government added in their constitution that the state guaranteed the rights and interests of the 
private economy in conformity with the law. This allowed private companies to have more 
than eight employers and they had a stronger legal status in the society. However the 
government still made sure that their strong hold was maintained, certain industries (so called 
key industries) were out of reach for private companies. The private sector was still reflected 
as a supplement to the state owned sector. Private firms needed to obtain many different 
formal approval items and the cost of founding a private firm was much greater than for other 
ownership forms. Nee and Opper (2012), argue that if the economy of private company would 
have developed within the institutional framework provided by the government, it would have 
been restricted to small scale commodity production and false collectives operating as a 
private business.  
It was not until Deng Xioping southern tour in 1992 where the private sector gained a 
more pragmatic role. On his tour Deng stressed the importance of economic reform and 
argued that socialism could adopt some elements of capitalism and that capitalism could have 
socialist elements (Zhao, 1993).  Deng’s speeches helped changing the inferior ideology that 
private firms were facing and resulted in a large amount of private entrepreneurs to establish 
new firms, which continued to drive China’s economic growth. Individually owned 
enterprises increased by approximately 20% between 1992 and 1994 and today the Chinese 
private sector contains considerably higher amount of companies in comparison to other 
company forms. Graph 2 shows the development of company registration from 1999 until 
2010. 
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Graph 2. Number of registered companies in Chinese industry
2
. 
 
  (Source: Various Chinese Yearbooks)  
 
Another feature that plays an important role in Chinese economic reform was the 
introduction of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the 1980’s, which opened up new 
possibilities for companies. The zones offered decent business environment for companies 
which further allowed them to develop and bring in tax revenue that was used to nurture the 
zone. The SEZ attracted foreign companies and new technology to the country that helped 
spur on the Chinese economic development.  
China still faces large problems in their economy, one that is commonly discussed is 
the weak protection of property rights in the country. The introduction of the company law in 
1994 was in theory a positive step in recognizing the private sector as previously mentioned, 
but the government did not hide its intend to keep state owned sector at the center of the 
reform. The Chinese government has introduced many new laws that are in line with other 
Western economies, the problem on the other hand is that they are not being fulfilled 
properly. If a country wants to have effective law enforcement it needs to have independent 
and effective judicial system and sufficient amount of qualified legal representatives. A study 
by Allen et al. (2005), shows how only one fifth of all lawyers in China have a degree in law 
and how lower fraction of judges have formally studied law in college or university. It is thus 
                                                 
2
 These are industry enterprises whose principle business revenue exceeds 5 million Yuan. 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Private companies
State owned companies
Limited liability companies
Collective companies
 14 
 
not surprising that private companies do not trust the legal system in China and seek to 
resolve disputes outside of court.  
In 2004 the Chinese government fully recognized private companies as equal to state 
owned companies and formally guaranteed that they would protect the lawful right and 
interest of the private sector. In 2007 China’s Property Rights Law was installed, the intend of 
the Property Rights Law was to represent regulation concerning creation, transfer and 
ownership of property (Nee and Opper, 2012). Despite the introduction of these laws many 
entrepreneurs remain skeptical that they would benefit from the juridical system.  
Because of the uncertainty of the rule of law in China, political capital has become 
subject of much research (Newton, 2001 and Birner and Witter, 2003). Zhou (2009), explains 
political capital as the resources of being trusted by political organization and political 
connection attained through relationship with a political organization as well as activities 
associated with this membership. Being a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or 
being connected to a high ranking politician within the party could thus give some advantage 
to the entrepreneur over others. Dickson, (2003) and Ng, (2006) argue that private 
entrepreneurs were trying to secure a CCP membership even before Jiang Zemin officially 
welcomed private entrepreneurship to join the CCP. Zhou (2009); Ng, (2006) and Liu, (2003) 
explain that CCP remains today a credential for successful careers in government controlled 
institutions and consider this as the most important form of political capital since China is a 
one party political system. Although there are possibilities to gain from political capital, not 
all entrepreneurs participate in it, investing in political capital can be time consuming and 
expensive (since it often involves investing in government sponsored projects) and might 
include maintaining relationship with corrupted party members. This is often too much of a 
burden for an entrepreneur who would rather spend his time and money on developing their 
own company. This especially applies to the once that believe that the government cannot 
benefit them (or stand in their way for example because of their size) in any way.  
As a result private companies need to compete on an unleveled playing field with 
other state owned companies. Not only are the property rights and the rule of  laws 
unpredictable and not dependable, private companies have also throughout the reform period 
found it difficult to obtain credit from formal financial institutions.  
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4.2 China´s financial market 
The Chinese financial market is characterized by a large banking sector that is predominately 
state owned, there are four main banks that dominate the sector. First, Bank of China that 
specializes in trade finance and foreign exchanges, second, Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China which provides working capital loans to SOE´s. Third, China Construction Bank 
which provides funds for construction and fixed investment and fourth, China Agricultural 
Bank which specializes in agricultural lending (Ayyagari et al. 2008). Along with these four 
main state owned banks there are several smaller banks. These four state owned banks are 
direct offspring from planned economy banking system, they are extremely large both in 
terms of assets and employment and rank among top 50 largest financial institutions in the 
world (Naughton, 2007). It is commonly agreed that the financial sector in China has lagged 
behind the rest of the economy during the reform process. The banking sector is overregulated 
and is still one of the most protected industries in the country.  
In recent years the financial sector has been undergoing great changes, the Chinese 
government has installed many laws and regulation in order to further develop their financial 
sector, and today the Chinese financial sector possesses all the same institutions that you 
would find in a developed Western economy. The Peoples Bank of China (the Central bank) 
sets monetary policy and provides credit to commercial banks and the China Bank Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) which is independent from The Peoples Bank of China keeps regulatory 
oversight over the monetary policy introduced by Peoples Bank of China. The restructuring of 
the sector has included allowing foreign banks to operate in the country, these changes were 
done in preparation to China’s entry to the World Trade Organization in 2001 as well as to 
prepare banks for equity listing. The sector has grown and diversified and today it includes 
commercial bank, government policy banks and independent banking institutions. Along with 
this, capital markets were introduces in 1992 with the establishment of Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock markets (Naughton, 2007). As previously mentioned the financial market has 
been diversified substantially in recent years, however despite the introduction of new players 
and new rules and regulations the market is still largely controlled by the four large state 
owned banks. Graph 3 shows the assets that different financial institutions possess, as can be 
seen the four state owned banks possess more than half of total assets of banking institutions. 
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Graph 3. Percentage of assets of banking institutions
3
. 
 
(Source: Naughton, 2007) 
 
Although, China´s banking system is large, other parts of the financial markets are 
relatively small in comparison to other countries in the world. Wang, Xu and Zhu (2004), 
showed how the Chinese equity and bond markets are smaller than in most other countries in 
term of market capitalization and as total value traded as a percentage of GDP.  An 
explanation for this is that the bond market is closely controlled by the government and the 
Chinese stock exchange performs poorly with relatively low return (Durnev et al., 2004). The 
stock exchanges largely consist of listed state owned companies were the state is always the 
majority stock holder (usually by having another state owned company as a majority 
shareholder) and private ownership is not allowed beyond 0.5% of total shares. A problem 
with the stock exchange is that shareholders have little protection rights, the legal framework 
in China has been slowly developed and has a weak enforcement. It is difficult for 
shareholders to have a voice since they are only allowed 0.5% of all shares which allows the 
largest shareholder (usually a state owned enterprise) to do whatever it feels is best. 
The private sector has from its emergence had difficulties in obtaining loans from 
formal financial institutions, it is apparent that state owned banks favor large SOE´s in certain 
key industries. There have been numerous attempts by the Chinese government to stimulate 
credit to the private sector but their effects have been minimal. For example the government 
                                                 
3
 The other category includes, state owned policy banks, rural credit cooperatives, rural commercial banks, urban 
credit cooperatives, nonbank financial institutions, Postal savings and foreign funded institutions. Among these 
rural credit banks possess around 10% of the assets for both years and state owned policy banks around 8% in 
2003 while others have considerable less. 
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introduced a new proactive fiscal policy in 2008 as a part of a stimulus package, which meant 
that state owned banks were to loosen credit and lend more freely to avoid a credit freeze 
which Western countries were facing (Revelle and Chiang, 2009). This meant that interest 
rates for loans and savings deposits with a one year duration were lowered and the 
government directly requested that the state owned banks were to facilitate access to loans for 
companies (this referred more to private companies since SOE´s and other state owned firms 
did in general not have troubles accessing loans from the banks) and for private households. 
However, when looking at where funds from the stimulus package were going it seems that 
they went mostly to large SOE´s. With heavy investment into public infrastructure such as 
railways, airports and power plants, Chinese steelmakers, cement producers and construction 
companies benefitted most while small and medium sized enterprises continued to experience 
difficulties. Graph 4 shows where credit from state owned banks was going from 2006 until 
2009 and as can be seen, only a fraction of the credit was going to private enterprises and self-
employed individuals. There is a slight rise following the government’s stimulus package in 
2008 but the amounts received by the private sector are still minimal.  
 
Graph 4. Credit funds of financial institutions. 
 
(Sources, Various Chinese Yearbooks) 
 
Much research has been conducted in order to explain why private companies find it 
difficult to obtaining loans from formal financial institutions. Zhou (2009), explained that 
weak property rights can worsen information asymmetry problem, as a result entrepreneurs 
are not prepare to give too much information to the lender and the lender feels that he does 
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not possess enough information regarding the project and is thus not prepared to lend because 
he might feel that the project is too risky. Others argue that the discrimination of lending from 
state owned banks is not as great as many believe. Anderson, (2006) argued that because the 
banking sector is characterized by short tail of corporate customers the banks are not 
discriminating against private small and medium sized companies but rather discriminating 
against small borrowers, which mostly includes small and medium sized private companies. It 
is important to note that the formal financial market has been and still is an important feature 
for the private sector and has played a role in its development, but it has not been as present as 
it perhaps should have been and has been in other countries during their reform. It seems that 
because of the lack of credit from formal sources private entrepreneurs depend more on 
internal financing (retained earnings and principal owner lending) as well lending from other 
informal sources.   
 
4.2.1 Informal credit 
The informal credit market needs to be recognized when discussing the development of the 
private sector in China. Because private enterprises found it difficult to obtain credit from 
formal financial institutions they needed to seek alternative lending in order to spur on their 
development. The informal lending can be divided into two different forms. First would be 
loans coming from family and friends, these loans are often with low or no interest rates. The 
second would be loans from curb market lending (Tsai, 2002 and Allen et al. 2006), trade 
credit or other informal lending institutions such as private money houses and underground 
lending organizations who function like banks (Farrell et al. 2006). These loans often come at 
high interest rates and are thus very expensive. The problem is that not much is known about 
how these informal market works and how much it has contributed to the development of the 
Chinese economy. Cull et al. (2009), discuss how trade credit was likely to be a substitute for 
loans for private firms that had difficulties in obtaining formal credit.  Allen et al. (2005), 
argue that during the first years of economic growth companies are able to develop through 
alternative lending institutions. McMillan and Woodruff (2002), on the other hand argue that 
to ascribe the extensive growth of the private sector to informal institutions is an 
overstatement. They argue that formal institutions are needed when competition forces down 
profit margins and when production and transaction becomes more complex, something that is 
present and growing in China.    
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5. Methodology 
The analysis of this thesis is conducted through quantitative approach. The thesis is a 
descriptive research focusing on the influencing factors on companies attain of loan quota 
from formal financial institutions in China and the influencing factors on companies total 
profits. Using data from Investment Climate Survey in China a cross sectional analysis will be 
performed using STATA data analysis and statistical software. Cross sectional analysis 
measures units from a sample at a one point in time, the object of this thesis is to find out if 
there is a correlation between dependent variables (loan quota and total profits) and numerous 
variables explained more thoroughly in chapter 6.  
 
5.1 Regression analysis 
Regression analysis determines the values of a parameter for a function that causes another 
function to best fit a set of data observations. It measures the effects of a change in variable 
(x) on another variable (y). Since the objective of this thesis is to measure effects and describe 
impact of various variables for one given year, cross sectional analysis is used. 
 
5.2 Multiple regression model 
Multiple regression models is a form of cross sectional analysis, the models takes more than 
one explanatory variable into corresponding economic mode. In this thesis both models 
introduced are multiple regression models. The bases for the empirical models used in this 
thesis is given in equation 1, both models are then described more thoroughly in later sections. 
 
Equation 1. The multiple regression model: 
 
yi= β1 + β2xi2 + β3xi3+ …+βkxik +ei  
 
Where yi is the dependent variable, xi are explaining independent variables and ei is a 
random variable (or residual). βi is the intercept and explains impact of each independent 
variable on dependent variable yi.  
There is one additional variable presented in the models in this thesis, a dummy 
variable (δ). Dummy variables can be used to shed light on rich variety of questions, it is 
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important to note that dummy variables are independent of other qualitative factors and thus 
need to have a reference group in order to interpret their results.  
 
5.3 Limitation of cross sectional analysis 
Although well respected within the world of academia it is important to note that cross 
sectional analysis has limitation, the main restraint is that it is not able to explain the causality 
of the findings. This implies that rare findings should not be explained only through cross 
sectional analysis but also through further deeper examinations. The findings should however 
not be dismissed because of these limitations, the information presented from these analysis 
are extremely valuable and in this case it can help to shape important policy changes within 
the Chinese financial market. 
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6. Data 
This study relies on a dataset from Investment Climate Survey (ICS) in China for the year 
2004. The ICS is conducted by the World Bank and its partners and has been conducted since 
1998. The data contains 12.400 observation covering firms of all sizes in many industries. The 
data was gathered through face to face interviews with managers and owners of the respected 
firms regarding investment climate and production of their company (World Bank, 2005). 
 
6.1 Sampling  
Since the goal of this study is to measure the effects on loan quota and total profits in 
companies it was important to conduct a model that explained which factors were influential. 
The sampling size was carefully selected, independent variables needed to have theoretical 
significance in regard to the dependent variables (loan quota and total profits) and all chosen 
variables were considered influential.  
Model 1 includes 1.807 observations, since the aim of this study is to measure effect 
of loan quota, only companies that had actual loan quota were considered. There are three 
different dummy variables in the model. The first, explains the ownership registration status 
of the companies, the second explains if General Manager (GM) were appointed by the 
government or not and the third represents the sectors that the companies operate in. The 
inclusion of them is important to show the differences between registration statuses, possible 
effects of political capital and if operating in a certain sector has effects on loan quota 
obtained.  
Model 2 includes 1.663 observations, this model aims to follow up on companies’ loan 
quota and its effect on total profits and as a result only companies that had actual loan quotas 
were considered. This model includes two different dummy variables, the first one being the 
ownership registration and the second the sector that the companies operate in. This model 
also includes new asset investment from the year 2003 in order to show the effects of asset 
investment on total profits of companies. By including asset investment in 2003 few 
observations were redundant and thus excluded, which explains the difference in total 
observation for the two models presented. 
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6.1.1 Limitations 
The available data in this dataset is not faultless, difficulties of precision and availability 
within certain variable can limit the use of the data as well as making results difficult to 
interpret. This dataset should however not be dismissed because of these predicaments, there 
is much information within the dataset which can be used to make important findings within 
Chinese business environment.  
 
6.2 The dependent variables  
The dependent variable used in model 1 is loan quota, the variable represent the approved 
credit amount that companies have obtained from formal financial institutions in China. 
Having a loan quota shows the possible credit that companies have access to, it does not 
represent the total amount of loans that companies have used. By using loan quota rather then 
used loans helps explaining the possibility for companies’ development potential. Having 
high loan quota gives managers of companies the possibility to invest in steps in their 
companies.  
The dependent variable used in model 2 is total profit for the year 2004. Total profits 
are commonly used in order to explain the production realization and development 
possibilities of a company. Branch (1974), explains how profits can have influence on 
research and development (R&D), and Schumpeter (1950), discussed how profits allow 
companies to take risks in regards to R&D in order to grow. The decision to use total profits 
as a measurement is to analyze if companies registration status in China matters in regards to 
profits. One should expect that if there is a significant difference in loan quota obtained 
between companies shown in model 1 there should be similar differences in total profits 
between companies in model 2.      
 
6.3 Key independent variable 
The key interest of this study is to see if company registration status plays a significant role 
once obtaining loan quota in China, the key independent variable is thus a dummy variable 
showing registration status of companies. 
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6.3.1 Company registration status   
The decision to use companies’ registration status rather than companies’ ownership structure 
is because of the interest in exploring if the registration status itself plays a decisive role once 
obtaining loan quota. Ownership structure can include many different ownership formulations 
which in turn are difficult to interpret and were thus considered irrelevant for this study. 
When creating the dummy variable of ownership registration status, five ownership 
forms were excluded; share joint owned units, shareholding companies, enterprises invested 
by Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, foreign invested enterprises and other enterprises. Since 
the focus on this study is to find out if being registered as a private company affects the 
possible loan quota from local formal financial institution, companies that are invested in 
from outside of China
4
 are excluded. The model also excludes shared joint owned units and 
shareholding companies. With the focus on differences between private and state owned 
companies the inclusion of shareholding corporation and share joint owned units which could 
include many different owners was considered insignificant
5
 for the study. Although private 
companies sometimes register themselves as a shareholding company, majority of those who 
decide to have a different registration form choose to register as limited liability companies, 
thus leaving the model with four ownership structures; state owned, collective, private and 
limited liability company status.  
 
6.4 Control variables  
Since there are many factors that can influence companies access to loan quotas and total 
profits the two models introduces the following control variables.  
 
6.4.1 Company structure  
It is important to try to control for the composition of the company structure, the data provides 
several variable that can be used in order to explain the structure of the company more 
thoroughly. The age of the company represents how long the company has been operating, the 
variable can explain if a company that has been operating for a long time is more likely to 
receive higher loan quotas then newly founded company. With maturity companies can bring 
                                                 
4
 Despite being considered by many as a part of China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are considered outside 
investment in this study because of their special business environment which differs in many ways from regular 
Chinese business environment.   
5
 In companies with different owners the power structure of the company would need to be considered. Because 
of many different structure possibilities it would be difficult to interpret and could give wrong impression of the 
possible effects. These ownership forms were thus excluded.  
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stability in growth because they learn more accurately on their cost structure and efficiency 
level, resulting in them not being surprised by profit outcomes and are thus less likely to 
revise their investment plans (Dunne and Hughes, 1994). 
The same applies for companies’ size, it is measured in number of employees within 
the company. Company size can influence obtained loan quota in a way that it should be 
expected that larger companies should be able to obtain higher loan quotas because of their 
size. Both estimations and empirical observations of the structure of bank loans have 
suggested that banks favor lending to larger firms (Meltzer, 1960). It needs to be considered 
that although company size commonly influences loan quotas and total profits it is possible 
that once it reaches certain size growth starts to slow down. For example a fast growing 
company sets higher target markups and restrains expansion plans in order to avoid driving 
down prices (Nelson and Winter, 1978; Dunne and Hughes, 1994). It is thus important to 
control for the size of the company in both models. 
 
6.4.2 Financial factors 
Expenditures play a significant role in regards to loan quota. Core business expenses of a 
company can influence the loan quota that a company is able to obtain. It should be expected 
that companies use their loan quota either for production expenses or investment within the 
company. The variable represents all expenditure of the company (including raw material 
expenses, taxation expenses and other compensations) in order to show the possible influence 
on obtained loan quota.  
The variable fixed assets represent total assets that companies possess, since it is 
common that formal financial institution require collateral when lending, the inclusion of the 
variable plays a significant part. Lenders usually know less than the borrower about the 
possible payoff of loans, these informational asymmetries are thus likely to affect access to 
loan quota (Besanko and Thakor, 1987). In order to mitigate the problem of informational 
asymmetric, collateral plays an important role (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). Formal 
financial institutions require collateral in order to reduce the risk of the loan become non-
performing. Having higher fixed assets should in theory give companies possibilities of higher 
loan quotas. Fixed assets also controls for the size of companies, because of its importance as 
collateral it is present along with total employment in model 1 while individually controls for 
the size of the company in model 2.  
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Investment is an important factor for all companies, investing in companies’ 
infrastructure increases the value of fixed assets which in turn could help obtain higher loan 
quota as previously discussed. The motives for companies to invest are to become more 
efficient in their production in order to increase their total profits. The inclusion of the 
variable fixed asset investment for the year 2003 should in theory increase companies’ total 
profits in 2004. It is important to note however that the return on investment can take more 
than one year to be relished and the problem of overinvesting can have negative effects on 
companies’ profits (Qin and Song, 2009).  
   
6.4.3 General Managers 
Because China is a communist country the government can be influential in companies’ 
production. The inclusion of the variable if General Managers (GM) of the company is 
appointed by the government is used in order to explain possible gains of political capital. 
Here political capital is regarded as relationship between and among actors to make possible, 
under certain circumstances, the realization of interests that otherwise would not be 
achievable (Nee and Opper, 2012). It is interesting and relevant to see if having a GM that is 
appointed by the government influences companies possibilities in obtaining loan quota.  If 
the person hired has good political connection it should be expected that the company would 
receive higher loan quota than companies that do not have this political connections.  
 
6.4.4 Sector  
The Chinese government introduces in its five year plan certain key sectors that are supposed 
to play a significant role in the countries quest for further economic development. It is thus 
important to control for different sectors since credit might be channeled at certain sectors 
making it difficult for companies in other sectors to obtain loan quota. Similarly, sectors that 
are state controlled should be returning higher profits then the ones that are neither considered 
key sector nor have large SOE´s that dominate the market. Summary and definition of the 
dependent and independent variables are presented in table 1 below.  
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Table 1. Variable definition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition and comment
Dependant variable 
Loan Quota Logarithm of loan quota in 1000 RMB
Total profits 2004 Logarithm of Total profits for year 2004 in 1000 RMB
Company registration status 
State owned registration Dummy variables, 1 if company registered as state owned; 0 otherwise
Collective registration Dummy variables, 1 if company registered as collectively owned; 0 otherwise
Limited liability registration Dummy variables, 1 if company is registered as limited liability company; 0 otherwise
Private registration Dummy variables, 1 if company is registered as private company: 0 otherwise
Company structure 
Total employees of the company Number of employers in a company
Age of the company The year the company was established minus 2004
(the year of the survey)
Financial factors
Operational expenses All expenditures of company in logarithm in 1000 RMB
Fixed assets Net fixed assets value of a company in 2004 in 1000 RMB
New asset investment 2003 New fixed assets investment in 2003 in 1000 RMB
General Manager
GM appointed by state Dummy variable, 1 if GM is appointed by the state; 0 otherwise 
Sectors
Sectors All sectors are dummy variables, that take on 1 for the respected sector; 0 otherwise
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7. Empirical analysis 
7.1 Variable summary  
In order to make sure that the model in use is well specified the model has been tested for 
heteroskedasticity
6
 and collinearity. The variables chosen are not correlated with each other in 
any significant manner, there is some correlation between fixed assets and total employment 
in model 1, which can be caused by both of the variables ability of measuring the size of the 
company. However because fixed assets play an important role in regards to collateral when 
applying for loan quota and total employment represents more obvious size of a company
7
 
both variables are kept in the model (for full table of collinearity see appendix table 3 and 4). 
The validity of the models is represented by their high R-square
8
 (0.3557 and 0.5413) 
indicating that the fraction of variance explained by the model is 35.57% for model 1 and 
54.13% for model 2. Summary statistics of the dependent and the independent variables for 
model 1 and model 2 are found in tables 2 and 3.  
 
Table 2. Summary statistic, model 1.  
 
                                                 
6
 See visual inspection of heteroskedasticity in appendix table 1 and 2. 
7
 Companies with few employees can have high amounts of assets, while it is not as common that small 
companies have high amount of employment (although there is always a possibility of that happening). 
8
 R-squared is defined as the amount of the sum of squares explained by a regression model, a value of 1,0 gives 
perfect prediction value of another term. 
Observations 1807
Mean Std Min Max
State owned registration* 0.121 0.326 0 1
Collective registration* 0.045 0.208 0 1
Limited liability registration* 0.669 0.471 0 1
Private registration* 0.165 0.371 0 1
GM appointed by state* 0.111 0.314 0 1
GM not appointed by state* 0.889 0.314 0 1
Log loan quota 9.394 2.339 -0.693 17.504
Log operational expenses 7.664 2.168 -0.357 14.799
Age of company 14.310 16.311 2 139
Total employment 1355.734 4768.81 12 114291
Fixed assets 243408 1679138 19 4.05e+07
Agriculture* 0.125 0.331 0 1
Tobacco industry* 0.006 0.074 0 1
Textile industry* 0.106 0.308 0 1
Chemical, Rubber and Plastic industry* 0.234 0.423 0 1
Medical and Pharmaceuticals* 0.034 0.182 0 1
Metal industry* 0.103 0.305 0 1
Machinery and equipment manufacturing* 0.225 0.417 0 1
Electric and communication manufacturing* 0.108 0.310 0 1
Other manufacturing* 0.046 0.211 0 1
*Dummy variables
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Table 3. Summary statistics, model 2. 
 
 
Using multiple regression model the following model was created to test the 
hypothesis presented above. 
7.2 Model 1  
log(Loan Quota) = 
α1 + β1 * log(operational expenses)i + β2 * (age of company)i + β3 * (total employment)i + 
β4* (fixed assets)i  +  δ1 * (state owned registration)i + δ2 * (collective registration)i + 
δ3* (limited liability registration)i+ δ4* (GM appointed by state)i + δ5 *(Sector)i + ei 
 
Where log(Loan Quota) is the dependent variable in logarithm. The reason for using 
logarithm is to better predict the findings, having the dependent variable as a logarithm 
generates all finding to be predicted in percentages. β1 - β4 are independent or explanatory 
variables and δ1 – δ5 are dummy variables. Dummy variables need a reference group in order 
to be interpreted, the model presents three different dummy variables. First is the registration 
status used in order to find out if there are differences between registration statuses when 
obtaining loan quota. The reference group for these dummies is company registered as 
private. The second dummy variable distinguishes between the appointment of GM, if it is 
done by the state or not, this is done in order to see if political capital helps companies in 
obtaining loan quota. The reference group for this dummy is GM that is not appointed by the 
state. The third reference group is the petroleum sector.  
Observations 1663
Mean Std Min Max
Collective registration* 0.055 0.228 0 1
Limited liability registration* 0.661 0.474 0 1
Private registration* 0.173 0.379 0 1
Log Total profits 2004 8.005 2.422 0 16.1986
New asset investment 2003 67453.85 1191318 0 4.78e+07
Age of company 14.220 15.973 2 139
Log fixed assets 10.122 2.081 1.740466 17.51642
Agriculture* 0.115 0.320 0 1
Tobacco industry* 0.007 0.081 0 1
Textile industry* 0.107 0.309 0 1
Chemical, Rubber and Plastic industry* 0.232 0.422 0 1
Medical and Pharmaceuticals* 0.032 0.176 0 1
Petroleum* 0.015 0.122 0 1
Machinery and equipment manufacturing* 0.229 0.420 0 1
Electric and communication manufacturing* 0.109 0.312 0 1
Other manufacturing* 0.044 0.206 0 1
*Dummy variables
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The result from the regression is presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4.    
 
 
7.3 Results from model 1 
When looking at companies’ registration status and relating it back to hypothesis 1, it 
becomes apparent that companies registered as private are receiving lower loan quotas than 
other forms of registration structures. The regression shows that state owned registered 
companies are receiving 49.70% higher loan quotas than private companies and limited 
liability companies are receiving 56.60% higher loan quotas. These results show the 
significance of registration status of companies and how it can be restraining for a company to 
be registered as a private. These results explain why many private companies prefer to register 
as a limited liability company rather than being registered as private company. We can thus 
accept hypothesis 1, companies registered as private ownership are receiving lower loan 
quotas than other forms of registration. 
Number of observations 1807
F( 27, 4206) 58.09
Sources SS Degrees of freedom MS Prob > F 0.0000
Model 3513.063 17 206.651 R-squared 0.3557
Residuals 6364.479 1789 3.558  Adj R-squared 0.3495
Total 9877.542 1806 5.469 Root MSE 1.8862
Dependant variable Coefficient Standard Error P > | t |
log Loan Quota
Independent variables 
State owned registration 0.497 0.203 0.015**
Collective registration 0.248 0.241 0.303
Limited liability registration 0.566 0.126 0.000***
log operational expenses 0.485 0.023 0.000***
Age of company 0.012 0.003 0.000***
Total employment 6.98e-04 1.4e-04 0.000***
Fixed assets 3.24e-08 3.81e-08 0.396
GM appointed by state 0.226 0.163 0.167
Sectors 
Agriculture -1.093 0.407 0.007***
Tobacco industry -0.400 0.721 0.579
Textile industry -0.349 0.410 0.395
Chemical, Rubber and Plastic industry -0.954 0.397 0.016**
Medical and Pharmaceuticals -1.095 0.455 0.016**
Metal industry -0.452 0.411 0.271
Machinery and equipment manufacturing -1.050 0.397 0.008***
Electric and communication manufacturing -1.007 0.410 0.014**
Other manufacturing -1.206 0.439 0.006***
constant 5.818 0.426 0.000***
*** Statistically significant at 99% confident level 
** Statistically significant at 95% confident level 
* Statistically significant at 90% confident level 
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When looking at the results from the regression we see that size, age and operational 
expenses play a significant role in regards to loan quota. All three variables are significant at 
99% confident level, one unit increase (percentage of operational expenses) results in 
companies being able to obtain additional loan quota of 48.5% (operational expenses), 1.20% 
(for additional year), and 0.00069% (for additional employee) respectable. Interestingly fixed 
assets have no relevance towards loan quota. Beforehand one might consider fixed assets to 
play a significant role regarding loan quota since it usually represents the collateral that 
companies offer formal financial institution as an insurance for the loan. What this indicates is 
that the decision to hand out loans to companies is perhaps based on a more subjective 
evaluation rather than a strategic one, meaning that the performance and possibilities of the 
company are not the most important factors when applying for loan quota.  
From what the regression shows it is not possible to say that having a GM that is hired 
by the state plays any significant part in companies’ possibilities in obtaining loan quota, 
which is in contradiction to previous consideration. However there can be a perfectly good 
explanation for that, being hired by the government does not automatically indicate that the 
person hired has good connection within the Chinese government. The personal ties of the 
recruited GM are perhaps more significant, then just having the state recruit a GM. 
When viewing the regression it becomes apparent that the operating sector of 
companies can be influential as well. Companies operating in the petroleum sector (mostly 
SOE´s) are receiving considerable higher loan quotas then most other sectors. 
These results are in line with previous studies such as Firth et al. (2009) and Brand and 
Li (2003) that companies registered as private ownership are being discriminated against and 
thus need to consider alternative lending in order to receive loans. Along with this the results 
give mixed results that are difficult to apply directly to economic development theory. That 
company size, companies’ age and operational expenses influence loan quota is in line with 
the theory. However the result that fixed assets is not significant is contradicting. Having 
assets to use as collateral is usually an important factor for companies and helps in their quest 
for loan quotas. The results imply that formal financial institutions are using subjective 
valuation in order to decide on loan quota for companies, making it difficult to locate factors 
that companies need to fulfill or have in order to obtain loan quotas.  
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7.4 Model 2 
 
Log(Total Profits 2004)= 
α1 + β1 *(age)i + β2 * (New asset investment 2003)i +β3 *log(Fixed assets)i + δ1 *(collective 
registration)i + δ2 *(limited liability registration)i +δ3 *(private registration)i + δ4 *(sector)i 
+ ei 
 
Here the dependent variable is the logarithm of total profits for the year 2004, β1-β4 are 
independent or explanatory variables and δ1-δ4 are dummy variables. As mentioned before 
dummy variables need a reference group and in this model there are two different dummy 
variables. First, like in the former model is company registration status and in this model the 
reference group is companies registered as state owned. Second dummy variable is the sectors 
where companies operate and here the reference group is metal production. 
The results from the regression are presented in table 5. 
 
Table 5. 
 
Number of observations 1663
F( 27, 4206) 129.57
Sources SS Degrees of freedom MS Prob > F 0.0000
Model 5276.502 15 351.767 R-squared 0.5413
Residuals 4471.446 1647 2.715  Adj R-squared 0.5371
Total 9747.948 1662 5.865 Root MSE 1.647
Dependant variable Coefficient Standard Error P > | t |
log Total Profits 2004
Independent variables 
Private registration 0.306 0.180 0.089*
Collective registration 0.291 0.222 0.191
Limited liability registration 0.260 0.149 0.082*
New asset investment 2003 5.80e-08 3.45e-08 0.093*
Age of company -0.004 0.003 0.167
log fixed assets 0.847 0.022 0.000***
Sectors 
Agriculture -0.154 0.172 0.372
Tobacco industry 1.412 0.521 0.007*
Textile industry -0.509 0.175 0.004**
Chemical, Rubber and Plastic industry -0.324 0.148 0.029**
Medical and Pharmaceuticals -0.324 0.257 0.190
Petroleum -0.657 0.353 0.063*
Machinery and equipment manufacturing -0.185 0.150 0.217
Electric and communication manufacturing 0.319 0.173 0.066*
Other manufacturing -0.734 0.229 0.001***
constant -0.556 0.307 0.070*
*** Statistically significant at 99% confident level 
** Statistically significant at 95% confident level 
* Statistically significant at 90% confident level 
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7.5 Results from model 2 
The results from the regression of model 2 show that there are significant difference in profits 
between companies registered as limited liability company and private company. Both 
company registration statuses are significant within 90% confidence level. The difference in 
regards to total profits on the other hand is perhaps not as large as one might have suspected. 
As model 1 presented limited liability companies were receiving 56.60% higher loan quotas 
then private companies but private companies are returning 4.60% higher total profits then 
limited liability companies
9
. The same applies to the differences between state owned and 
private companies, state owned companies were receiving 49.70% higher loan quotas but 
private companies were returning 30.60% higher total profits. Limited liability company on 
the other hand is returning 26.0% higher total profits then state owned companies. 
Since collective registration status is insignificant it is not possible to use it in 
comparison to the other registration forms.  In beforehand one would expect that because 
limited liability companies and state owned companies were receiving considerable higher 
loan amounts then privately registered companies they would be returning higher total profits. 
This leads to some contradiction, why are privately registered companies returning higher 
profits then limited liability companies and state owned companies if they are receiving less 
loan quotas then the other? These results indicate that loan quota from formal financial 
institutions is perhaps not as significant as many suspect. It indicates that private companies 
are not restricted to these loan quotas but find other sources in order to continue their 
development. This is in line with previous studies such as Zhang and Ming (2001) and Lardy 
(1999) who argued that private companies used informal credit market to finance their 
investments. We can thus not accept hypotheses 2, companies that are receiving higher loan 
quotas are not returning higher total profits then the other registration form of companies. 
What is interesting to see is that age of the company does not play a significant role in 
regards to companies’ total profits. In a way this comes as a surprise since it should be 
expected that companies that have been operating for longer time should constantly add to its 
experience and knowledge of the respected operational field and thus be able to increase their 
production and efficiency more precisely than younger companies. On the other hand there 
might be a perfectly fair explanation for these results, although older companies gain 
experience and know how over time the age of the company cannot constantly influence total 
                                                 
9
 Here both companies are compared to state ownership and the number comes from the difference in total 
profits compared to state owned company. Private company and limited liability company are not directly 
compared to each other. 
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profits of a company. Other factors need to be present as well, companies need to invest in 
order to develop (or grow) and the company needs to make correct investments. Along with 
this market environment might be playing significant role, if the market is experiencing 
recession because of outside factors (for example because of world financial crisis) the age of 
the company does not necessarily affect the performance of a company. It would be expected 
that older companies would be better equipped to handle those kinds of downswings because 
of their experience and know-how but that is not necessarily the case as has been seen in the 
recent world financial crisis. During these down swings companies focus on surviving in 
difficult environment and although older companies might have more experience it does not 
automatically indicate that those companies will return higher total profits then the other 
younger companies.  
As can be seen from the results fixed assets is significant within 99% confident level, 
it indicates that increase in companies fixed assets by one percentage (because the variable is 
in logarithm) results in 84.70% increase in total profits. Because fixed assets are usually an 
indicator of companies’ size this suggests that larger companies are receiving higher profits 
then smaller companies. Something that is in line with theories, but this shows the 
significance of the size of the companies. By continuously investing in the company they 
should have more possibilities in developing and thus returning higher profits. However as 
mentioned before there is a thin line between investing and overinvesting, companies need to 
make sure that they are investing in right sectors at the right time. What is interesting is that 
investment from previous year cannot be considered statistically significant, although the 
variable new investment in 2003 is significant within 90% confidence level, the effects that it 
has on total profits in extremely low. This can be explained by the fact that investments are 
often not expected to show returns until after a certain amount of time. Investment is 
important for companies since it increases companies’ total fixed assets but the full results of 
it might not become apparent until after couple of years depending on the nature of the 
investment. 
It does not come as a surprise that there are considerable differences in profits between 
sectors. The sectors that are considered as key sectors and are represented by large SOE´s are 
returning considerable higher profits then sectors where smaller private and limited liability 
companies are operating on.  Textile, manufacturing and chemical sector are returning 
50.90% and 73.35% and 32.36 % lower profits then the metal industry. Other sectors such as 
petroleum sector is returning 65.65% lower profits (which is interesting since the petrol sector 
is one of the key sectors presented by the Chinese government) while electronic 
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manufacturing is returning 31.89% higher profits then the metal industry. Although 
companies are returning profits the differences between sectors are great, this shows the 
differences between sectors containing large SOE´s and sectors where other company forms 
are more present. However because large share of SOE´s in China are enormous in size in 
comparison to other companies these results should not come as a surprise.  
 
7.6 Discussion 
The rapid growth of the Chinese private market is a unique subject that has left scholars 
around the world stunned. Despite many hindrances such as weak property protection, 
underdeveloped financial market and retarded access to formal credit the market has manage 
to develop into being one of the largest contributors in Chinese economy. Discrimination 
between company forms has for a long time been a problem in the Chinese economy, Chinese 
entrepreneurs seem to be more extensively registering their companies as limited liability 
company rather than a private company in order to have better access to important resources. 
And who blames them, as is seen in model 1, being registered as limited liability company or 
state owned company is giving companies considerable higher amounts of loan quota then if 
the company is registered as private. It is understandable that if companies are in need for 
credit and know that being registered as a private company is restraining, that they rather opt 
to have friends help them founding a limited liability company and then run it as a private one 
(with the co-founders having no decision power in the company).  
In theory as previously discussed, having better access to credit should lead to 
companies returning higher profits and more rapid development. That however is not the case 
in China, privately registered companies are returning considerable higher total profits in 
2004 compared to other registration forms, raising fundamental questions. If they have lower 
access to credit then other company forms why are they returning higher profits? There are 
couple of explanation that could help understand why private companies are returning higher 
profits despite lower access to credit. First, it is possible and even expected that private 
companies are receiving their credit from informal sources. As has been argued by many 
scholars (Brandt and Li (2003) and Cull et al. (2009)), it has been difficult for private 
companies to attain credit from formal sources from the beginning of the opening up policy. 
They have always needed to turn to alternative lending, such as loans from friends or family, 
trade credit or other informal sources. Second, because private companies have always had 
difficulties in obtaining formal loans they have stopped counting on it as a possible source for 
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lending, thus they are more likely to use a fraction of their profit or other forms of internal 
capital market to further invest in their company instead of turning to lending.  Third, could 
be incentive problems, it is possible that because state owned companies and limited liability 
companies have easier access to credit the incentives to invest properly in their company is 
perhaps not as great as for a private company. The incentive problem should however apply 
more directly to state owned companies rather than to limited liability company since many of 
them are run as a private company with minimum government interference.  
The results from the models suggests that private companies are using alternative 
lending from informal sources, however it is important to note that it is not possible to 
generalize that all private companies constantly turn to informal sources when in need of 
credit. Private companies are run in their own unique way without any outside interference (in 
most cases) and although they are not using formal credit when in need it does not 
automatically mean that they are then using informal credit. Many private firms use internal 
capital markets as their main source of investing and do thus not need to count on other forms 
of lending.  
The results also show the discrimination that private companies are faced with in 
China. The paper adds to previous literature such as Nee and Opper, (2012); Allen et al., 
(2005), Zhou, (2009) and Brandt and Li, (2003), regarding governments discrimination and its 
effects on private companies. Private companies are not competing on a level playing field 
with the government still favoring SOE´s in certain sectors.  
Capital deepening has indeed helped Chinese economy to develop as Dic Lo (2006) 
argues, however capital deepening alone can only help economies up to a certain point, the 
need for investment (in companies, human capital, innovation etc.) to further develop is 
critical as well. The CCP needs to realize that innovation and R&D can be capital intensive 
and many small and medium size companies do not have the resources to support it properly. 
Private companies are in general considered better innovator then SOE´s and thus it can be 
decisive for the future growth of China that the CCP makes sure that productive and efficient 
private companies are supported in their innovative thinking. The CCP cannot rely on SOE´s 
as their main innovator and thus needs to channel credit towards the private sector.  
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8. Conclusion 
The private sector has since the opening up policy developed into becoming a major 
contributor to Chinese economy. The development of the sector is even more remarkable 
given the lack of conventional infrastructure of the financial market in China (Allen et al, 
2005). This thesis seeks to determine if company registration status matters when obtaining 
loan quota from formal financial institutions and what factors are influential on the size of the 
loan quota that companies receive. It then moves into exploring if there is a significant 
difference in total profits of the differently registered companies to explore if formal loan 
quota is decisive for companies development.   
The results show that company registration matters greatly once receiving loan quota 
from formal financial institution in China. Companies registered as private are receiving 
49.70% lower loan quotas then state owned companies and 56.60% lower than limited 
liability companies. It is also notable that fixed assets play no significant role in regards to 
loan quota which is contradicting to other developed financial markets where fixed assets play 
important role as collateral. With fixed assets playing no significant role in obtaining loan 
quota it seems that the decision of formal financial institutions in China to grant loan quotas 
are perhaps based on a more subjective decisions rather than a strategic one. 
The results also show that despite receiving considerable less formal loan quota, 
privately registered companies are still returning higher total profits then the other two 
registration forms, indicating that formal loan quota does not play a decisive role for the 
development of private companies. The results indicate that private companies seek 
alternative lending from informal sources once in need for credit and supports previous 
studies from Zhang and Ming (2001) and Lardy (1999) regarding the importance of informal 
credit market in China.  
These outcomes show that companies in China are still not playing on a leveled 
playing field, privately registered firms struggle to receive loan quotas from formal financial 
institutions and thus need to turn to alternative lending (Cull et al., 2009). The current 
environment encourages private companies to register as different ownership form (many 
register as limited liability companies) which in turn starts to give wrong impression of the 
private sector in China. If the private sector is to continue its development the government 
needs to make sure those productive private firms get the access to credit that they need 
otherwise chances are that the private market starts to stagnate. The government cannot 
neglects sector such as the textile and manufacturing industry since they are still playing an 
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important role for the Chinese economy, they need to support those sectors along with 
promoting R&D and innovation otherwise they run the risk of these sectors starting to 
stagnate or experience recession something that could be very costly for them in the short and 
long run. 
The government is starting to acknowledge the importance of making credit available 
for private firms, in 2004 they presented guidelines for commercial banks to lend to private 
enterprises (Firth et al, 2009). It will be important that commercial banks follow these 
guidelines, if companies are to start R&D and innovation (in more magnitude then they are 
currently doing) access to capital plays an important role. The CCP can not only count on 
large SOE´s to be responsible for innovation. Private companies in general have higher 
incentives to create something new and they should be at the center of innovation and R&D 
development.   
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Appendix 
Appendix table 1. Visual inspection of heteroskedasticity, model 1. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix table 2. Visual inspection of heteroskedasticity, model 2. 
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Appendix table 3. Correlation matrix, model 1. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix table 4. Correlation matrix, model 2. 
 
 
Variable (1)
Log Loan quota 1.00 (2)
Log Operational expenses 0.54 1.00 (3)
Age of company 0.25 0.25 1.00 (4)
Total employment 0.35 0.33 0.25 1.00 (5)
Fixed assets 0.25 0.21 0.15 0.72 1.00 (6)
Collective registration -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 (7)
Limited liability registration 0.06 0.05 -0.19 -0.05 -0.03 -0.31 1.00 (8)
State owned registration 0.16 0.17 0.46 0.17 0.10 -0.08 -0.53 1.00 (9)
GM appointed by state 0.15 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.13 0.08 -0.23 0.46 1.00 (10)
Agriculture -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.08 -0.05 1.00 (11)
Tobacco industry 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.16 0.12 -0.03 1.00 (12)
Textile industry 0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 -0.13 -0.03 1.00 (13)
Chemical, Rubber and Plastic industry -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.21 -0.04 -0.19 1.00 (14)
Medicine and Pharmaceuticals 0.01 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.10 1.00 (15)
Metal industry 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.14 0.15 0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.13 -0.03 -0.12 -0.19 -0.06 1.00 (16)
Machinery and equipment manufacturing 0.01 0.04 0.21 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.06 0.15 0.10 -0.20 -0.04 -0.19 -0.30 -0.10 -0.18 1.00 (17)
Electric and communication manufacturing 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.00 0.00 -0.13 -0.03 -0.12 -0.19 -0.07 -0.12 -0.19 1.00 (18)
Other manufacturing -0.11 -0.12 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.12 -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 -0.08 1.00 (19)
Variable (1)
Log Total Profits 2004 1.00 (2)
Collective registration -0.06 1.00 (3)
Limited Liability registration 0.03 -0.34 1.00 (4)
Private registration -0.14 -0.11 -0.64 1.00 (5)
Age of company 0.21 0.02 -0.17 -0.18 1.00 (6)
New asset investment 2003 0.13 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.07 1.00 (7)
Log Fixed assets 0.73 -0.09 0.01 -0.20 0.33 0.14 1.00 (8)
Agriculture -0.08 -0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.10 -0.02 -0.13 1.00 (9)
Tobacco industry 0.13 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.15 0.01 0.12 -0.03 1.00 (10)
Textile industry -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.13 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.13 -0.03 1.00 (11)
Other manufacturing -0.11 0.03 -0.04 0.09 -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 1.00 (12)
Petroleum 0.02 0.04 -0.08 0.05 0.00 -0.00 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 1.00 (13)
Chemical, Rubber and Plastic industry -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.20 -0.04 -0.19 -0.12 -0.07 1.00 (14)
Medicine and Pharmaceuticals -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.10 1.00 (15)
Machinery and equipment manufacturing 0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.06 0.19 -0.02 0.02 -0.20 -0.04 -0.19 -0.12 -0.07 -0.30 -0.10 1.00 (16)
Electric and communication manufacturing 0.10 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.13 -0.03 -0.12 -0.08 -0.04 -0.19 -0.06 -0.19 1.00 (17)
